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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Timothy Eugene Wright appeals from his judgment of conviction for 
robbery. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Two men armed with handguns robbed the Cash Store, a loan business in 
Idaho Falls, by entering, threatening the two employees, and taking about $2,700 
in cash. (Trial Tr., p. 15, L. 1 - p. 30, L. 15; p. 35, L. 22 - p. 43, L. 12; p. 162, L. 
8 - p. 168, L. 8.) The state charged Wright with robbery for that incident and also 
alleged a firearm enhancement. (R., pp. 22-23.) The enhancement was 
dismissed upon the state's motion. (R., pp. 41,47.) 
The case proceeded to jury trial, where the primary issue was identity, 
after which the jury convicted Wright as charged. (R., pp. 57-70, 72-81, 84-87; 
see generally Trial Tr.; see also 6/10/10 Tr., p. 92, L. 20 - p. 111, L. 25.) The 
evidence that indicated Wright was the robber included: he was of the same 
general height, stature and race as the robbers and had a similar voice (Trial Tr., 
p. 27, Ls. 9-18; p. 29, Ls. 21-25; p. 177, L. 22 - p. 178, L. 24); one of the victims 
had positively identified Kenneth Wright, Wright's brother and another passenger 
in the car in which Wright was stopped shortly after the robbery, as the other 
robber (Trial Tr., p. 168, L. 9 - p. 170, L. 14; p. 208, L. 8 - p. 210, L. 14); both 
Wright brothers possessed shoes matching the footprints left at or near the 
robbery (Trial Tr., p.123, L.15-p.145, L.14; p.146, L.15-p.151, L.12); 
Wright and his associates were in possession of bills in numbers and 
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denominations closely matching the money stolen in the robbery (Trial Tr., p. 
275, L. 21 - p. 276, L. 8; p. 326, L. 24 - p. 327, L. 12; p. 359, L. 12 - p. 366, L. 
12); ski masks consistent with those worn by the robbers were found in the car in 
which Wright was a passenger (Trial Tr., p. 95, Ls. 8-15; p. 175, Ls. 15-21; p. 
272, Ls. 1-8; p. 342, L. 3 - p. 343, L. 6); the car in which Wright was later 
stopped was seen fleeing near the scene of the robbery shortly after the robbery 
(Trial Tr., p. 72, L.7 - p. 80, L. 13); Wright lied to police about his whereabouts 
and activities at the time of the crime and even about his shoe size (Trial Tr., p. 
267, L. 3 - p. 268, L. 1; p. 332, Ls. 11-22); Wright was present (and 
photographed) at businesses near the scene of the robbery shortly before the 
robbery (Trial Tr., p. 293, L. 13 - p. 299, L. 21; p. 301, L. 25 - p. 320, L. 11; p. 
327, L. 13 - p. 332, L. 10; p. 333, L. 3 - p. 341, L. 6); Wright tried to conceal the 
money in his physical possession (Trial Tr., p. 216, L. 25 - p. 219, L. 7); and 
photographs taken near the time and place of the robbery showed Wright 
wearing a hoody jacket identical to one worn by one of the robbers (Trial Tr., p. 
255, L. 25 - p. 256, L. 22; p. 259, L. 18 - p. 263, L. 4; p. 276, L. 9 - p. 278, L. 2; 
p. 333, L. 3-p. 341, L. 6). 
The district court entered judgment, sentencing Wright to life with fifteen 




Wright states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Wright's due process rights 
to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence when it 
placed him in restraints and informed the jury that he was so 
restrained? 
2. Was Mr. Wright deprived of his constitutional rights to due 
process and a fair trial when the prosecutor elicited 
testimony that Mr. Wright invoked his Fourth Amendment 
right and referred to that fact in opening statements and 
closing arguments? 
3. Did the district court err when it permitted the State to offer 
irrelevant prior bad acts evidence over Mr. Wright's 
objection? 
4. Under the doctrine of cumulative error, was Mr. Wright's right 
to a fair trial denied as a result of the accumulation of serious 
errors throughout his trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Wright failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when 
it ordered that Wright appear for at least a short while in restraints after 
Wright became combative and threatening to court security personnel? 
2. Has Wright failed to show prosecutorial misconduct for using evidence of 
Wright's attempts to obstruct the investigation as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt? 
3. Has Wright failed to show that evidence he had entered a bank and 
behaved suspiciously the day before the robbery was irrelevant? 





Wright Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Ordered That Wright Appear For At Least A Short While In Restraints After 
Wright Became Combative And Threatening To Court Security Personnel 
A. Introduction 
During the second day of trial, just after the first witness had been cross-
examined by his counsel, Wright interrupted the judge in order to try to make a 
statement. (Trial Tr., p. 48, Ls. 11-12.) The judge told Wright he "may not" make 
a statement. (Trial Tr., p. 48, L. 13.) Very shortly thereafter, and immediately 
after the next witness had been sworn but before he could testify, the court 
spontaneously ordered an unscheduled recess for defense counsel to consult 
with the defendant. (Trial Tr., p. 48, L. 25 - p. 49, L. 2.) Upon reconvening 
outside the presence of the jury the court put on the record that the marshal had 
informed it that "Mr. Wright has become combative and threatening to the 
Marshal and I have authorized, as a result of that, that he be restrained and 
continue to be restrained until further order." (Trial Tr., p. 49, Ls. 12-18.) Neither 
Wright nor his counsel disputed the marshal's report. (ld.) 
The court the'n granted Wright's motion to proceed without counsel. (Trial 
Tr., p. 49, L. 18 - p. 55, L. 12.) During that colloquy the court made sure Wright 
was aware that if he was disruptive he could be removed from the courtroom or 
gagged and that if that happened he would be left without representation in the 
courtroom. (Trial Tr., p. 52, L. 20 - p. 53, L. 12.) 
Before the jury was brought in Wright asked for removal of the restraints, 
but the court declined, referencing an incident "downstairs" and stating that it was 
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not going to have Wright "threatening the Marshals." (Trial Tr., p. 57, Ls. 7-13.) 
Again Wright did not dispute that there had been an incident or that he had 
threatened the marshals. (Id.) Once the jury was in place the court informed it 
that Wright had elected to represent himself and that there had been a "little fuss" 
and the court had ordered that "Mr. Wright be restrained," but that he would 
"loosen that up" if Wright "behaves himself here." (Trial Tr., p. 57, L. 22 - p. 58, 
L. 7.) The record does not indicate whether the restraints were either removed or 
in place at any other point of the trial. (See generally Trial Tr.; R., pp. 57-70, 72-
81.) 
Wright does not claim that using restraints because he threatened a 
marshal was an abuse of discretion. (See generally Appellant's brief, pp. 6-12.) 
Rather, he argues on appeal that the district court erred because it (1) ordered 
restraints to be used "without an evidentiary hearing," (2) informed the jury of the 
restraints, and (3) "failed to use the least restrictive and visible restraints 
available." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Application of the relevant law shows that 
Wright has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The determination of whether to restrain a defendant at trial is 
discretionary. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005). A discretionary 
decision will be reversed on appeal only where there is a showing by the 
appellant of an abuse of discretion. See, SUL., State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
_, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (abuse of discretion standard applied to challenge 
to admission of evidence). 
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C. Wright Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In Relation To 
Ordering The Use Of Restraints 
"[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical 
restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of 
its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular triaL" 
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005). "We believe trial judges confronted 
with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given 
sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case." Illinois v. Allen, 
397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). "The use of any restraint must be based upon a 
finding of the necessity for that restraint." State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140, 147, 
898 P.2d 71,78 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Here the district court ordered restraints based on the finding that Wright 
had become combative and threatened the marshals. (Trial Tr., p. 49, Ls. 14-18; 
p. 57, Ls. 9-13.) On appeal Wright does not argue that his actions of becoming 
combative and threatening the marshals were insufficient grounds for the court's 
exercise of discretion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-12.) Instead, Wright argues on 
appeal that the district court erred by not holding a hearing (Appellant's brief, pp. 
8-10); by informing the jury of the restraints (Appellant's brief, p. 10); and by not 
using the "least visible restraint possible" (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12). None of 
these issues were preserved at trial, however. 
The appellate court will address an issue raised for the first time on appeal 
only if the appellant shows fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
_, 245 P .3d 961, 979 (2010). To demonstrate fundamental error the appellant 
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must show that the alleged error "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
kL at _, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this standard in this case shows 
Wright has failed to demonstrate fundamental error. 
1. Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Lack Of A 
Hearing 
Depriving the defense of an opportunity to challenge the need for 
restraints prior to the defendant's appearance before the jury in restraints can 
violate due process: 
We hold, therefore, that under the circumstances of this 
case, where the district court had originally ordered that the 
defendant stand trial without physical restraints, but then rescinded 
the order based upon information obtained in a hearing which 
neither the defendant nor his counsel were advised of or attended, 
where neither the defendant nor his attorney had any opportunity to 
contest the order or suggest a less visible means of restraint before 
the defendant was first exposed to the jury, and where timely 
objection to the restraints was made, the defendant's rights to a fair 
trial and to appear and defend in person and with counsel 
guaranteed by the due process clauses ... were violated, and he is 
entitled to a new trial. 
State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 98, 577 P.2d 1135, 1146 (1978) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). However, if "counsel for the accused desires to object 
to the defendant being brought before the court in leg restraints, he or she should 
do so before the jurors arrive or after requesting a hearing outside the presence 
of the jury." State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 105, 822 P.2d 998, 1002 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
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In this case the marshal informed the court that Wright had become 
combative and was threatening the marshal. (Trial Tr., p. 49, Ls. 14-16.) A court 
may rely upon such representations. State v. Moen, 94 Idaho 477, 479, 491 
P.2d 858, 860 (1971) ("In exercising its discretion, the judge need not rely only 
upon evidence formally offered and admitted at trial. His knowledge may 
properly stem from official records or what law enforcement officers have told 
him."). The district court informed Wright in court before the jury entered that this 
was the ground for ordering Wright restrained during the proceedings. (Trial Tr., 
p. 49, Ls. 12-18.) Neither Wright nor his soon-to-be-discharged counsel objected 
or challenged the marshal's version of events. (Trial Tr., p. 49, L. 12 - p. 57, L. 
13.) Wright did not dispute the marshal's representations or request a hearing to 
present additional evidence despite the opportunity to do so. He must therefore 
demonstrate on appeal fundamental error from the lack of a formal hearing. 
Wright has failed to show constitutional error, the first prong of the 
fundamental error standard. Indeed, he has failed to show error at all. It is the 
defendant's burden to object prior to being seen by the jury. Knutson, 121 Idaho 
at 105, 822 P .2d at 1002. Only if the district court acted in a way to deprive 
Wright of the ability to make a timely objection is there constitutional error. 
Crawford, 99 Idaho at 98, 577 P.2d at 1146. Here the court provided ample 
opportunity for Wright to challenge the evidence that he had been combative and 
threatening. Wright has shown no constitutional error in the lack of a hearing. 
Wright has also failed to show error that can be considered clear on the 
record. Wright was made aware of the district court's determination that he had 
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been combative and threatening and the source of the court's information to that 
effect. Yet Wright did not deny that he had been combative or threatening or 
otherwise challenge that finding of fact. There is nothing in the record suggesting 
that Wright disagreed with the court's finding that he had been combative and 
threatening or that he had any evidence to present that would show he had not 
been combative and threatening. There is a perfectly logical explanation for why 
Wright did not object: he knew he had been combative and threatening. 
Finally, Wright bears the burden of showing prejudice. The record here 
suggests that Wright did not dispute the fact that he had been combative and 
threatening. The record certainly shows no contrary evidence. Lack of a formal 
hearing on this apparently uncontested fact did not prejudice Wright. 
2. Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error From The Court 
Telling The Jury About The Restraints 
After returning from the break the court stated to the jury that there were 
two changes during the break-the discharge of defense counsel and the use of 
restraints. (Trial Tr., p. 57, L. 17 - p. 58, L. 8.) The court informed the jury of the 
reason for the change in restraint. (Id.) There was no objection or motion for a 
mistrial at that (id.), or any other, time. Wright apparently claims that the court 
could have avoided any prejudice to him by not speaking about the restraints. 
He has failed to demonstrate how informing the jury of the restraints constituted 
fundamental error. 
First, Wright has shown no constitutional violation. It is "axiomatic" that 
the use of restraints cannot violate due process if the use of restraints was 
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unknown to the jury. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 293, 955 P.2d 603, 608 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (factual finding that jurors did not see restraints foreclosed due 
process violation claim). As set forth above, a defendant may be visibly 
restrained if the court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds sufficient grounds to 
do so. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
343 (1970); State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140,147,898 P.2d 71,78 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The jury being aware of the restraints is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for finding a due process violation. Because the district court properly 
exercised its discretion to restrain him, Wright has failed to show any due 
process violation arising merely from the fact that the jury was aware of the 
restraints. 
Nor is the error clear on the record. The record does not indicate that the 
jury was or would have remained unaware of the restraints. To the contrary, the 
district court informed the jury informed the jury of the reason for the restrains "so 
there's no question as far as what's going on" (Trial Tr., p. 58, Ls. 3-6), strongly 
indicating that the district court was aware that the jury would see the restraints. 
Thus, there is nothing clear in the record that the court could have avoided any 
potential prejudice arising from the use of restraints by merely not commenting 
on them. 
Finally, Wright has shown no prejudice from the court's comments. 
Because the record does not support the inference that the jury would have 
remained ignorant of the restraints but for the court's comments, Wright's claims 
of prejudice are entirely speculative. 
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3. Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error By The Alleged 
Failure To Use The Least Visible Means Of Restraint 
Corollary to the rule that due process is not implicated if the jury is 
unaware of the restraints, some courts have held that a court ordering restraints 
that cannot be completely concealed from the jury must still use the "least visible" 
restraints necessary to secure the defendant to avoid undue prejudice. 
Stephenson v. Wilson, 619 F.3d 664, 668-69 (ih Cir. 2010) (and cases cited) 
(cited at Appellant's brief, p. 11.) A similar rule has been adopted in Idaho by 
statute prohibiting "any more restraint than is necessary." I.C. § 19-108; State v. 
Miller, 131 Idaho 288,293,955 P.2d 603,608 (Ct. App. 1998). Because Wright 
did not at trial object that his restraint was more than necessary or show that less 
visible restraints could have been used, he has the burden of showing 
fundamental error on appeal. 
There is no fundamental error because Wright has failed to show 
constitutional error, the first prong of the fundamental error test. As set forth 
above, a defendant may be visibly restrained if the court, in the exercise of its 
discretion, finds sufficient grounds to do so. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 
(2005); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970); State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140, 
147, 898 P.2d 71, 78 (Ct. App. 1995). Indeed, such restraint may extend to 
gagging the defendant. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344 (defendant can be shackled and 
gagged "as a last resort"). Wright has failed to show that the restraints used 
were so prejudicial in relation to the risk he presented as to be an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion. 
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The error is not clear on the record. Nowhere in the record are the types 
of restraints used made clear. It is possible we are dealing with handcuffs, leg 
restraints, a shock belt, or even a belly chain. We simply do not know because 
Wright never asserted the claim that less visible restraints should be employed. 
Wright has failed to show on the record a clear abuse of discretion. 
Finally, because Wright has failed to show that a less visible restraint was 
even possible, he has failed to show prejudice. Wright has failed to show 
fundamental error by his claim that the district court should have used a less 
visible restraint. 
II. 
Wright Has Failed To Show Prosecutorial Misconduct For Using Evidence Of 
Wright's Attempts To Obstruct The Investigation As Evidence Of Consciousness 
Of Guilt 
A. Introduction 
During the trial the prosecutor used evidence of Wright's attempts to 
obstruct the investigation, including not cooperating with efforts to photograph the 
soles of his shoes, hiding money, and lying in his interview, as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt. (7/7/10 Tr., p. 23, L. 5 - p. 24, L. 23; Trial Tr., p. 99, L. 8 
-po 100, L. 24; p.111, L. 19-p.112, L. 9; p. 210, L. 24-p. 212, L. 23; p. 216, 
L. 8 - p. 219, L. 15; p. 234, L. 11 - p. 235 L. 4; p. 251, L. 20 - p. 272, L. 17; 
7/10/10 Tr., p. 105, L. 23 - p. 106, L. 7; p. 107, L. 19 - p. 108, L. 3; State's 
Exhibits 6, 7, 56.) For the first time on appeal Wright invokes the fundamental 
error rule and claims that his efforts at obstructing the investigation in relation to 
the photographing of the soles of his shoes were actually attempts to invoke his 
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Fourth Amendment rights. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-21.) Wright's claim of 
fundamental error does not withstand analysis. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 
457,459,767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). 
C. Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecution's Use 
Of Evidence That Wright Attempted To Obstruct The Investigation 
Wright concedes that this appellate claim of error is unpreserved by timely 
objection to the trial court. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) An unpreserved issue may 
only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that 
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) 
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for 
any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the 
13 
error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a 
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." 19.:. at _, 245 P.3d at 978. Review shows that Wright has failed 
to show any of the three prongs necessary to prevail on his claim of fundamental 
error. 
1. Wright Has Shown No Constitutional Error 
Wright has failed to show that he was asserting a constitutional right by 
resisting efforts by police to view the bottoms of his shoes. 1 In State v. Curry, 
103 Idaho 332, 334-35, 647 P.2d 788, 790-91 (Ct. App. 1982), officers stopped 
Curry and his companions on suspicion of burglary. They "asked Curry to hold 
his foot up so the officers could look at the sole of his shoe." 19.:. at 338, 647 P.2d 
788, 794. In addressing Curry's claim that this constituted a search the Idaho 
Court of Appeals applied the expectation of privacy test of the Fourth 
Amendment, compared looking at the sole of the shoe to obtaining a handwriting 
or voice exemplar, in which there are no privacy rights, and held that "Curry did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the physical 
characteristics of the soles of his shoes." kl 
The holding of the Idaho Court of Appeals that there is no privacy concern 
arising from a viewing of the bottom of a shoe in the course of a proper 
investigative stop is consistent with the holdings of other courts that have 
1 Wright does not assert that introduction of evidence of resistance to lawful 
police actions based upon a mistaken belief that such actions are unlawful raises 
due process concerns. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-21.) The state therefore does 
not address that issue in this brief. 
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considered the question. There is no privacy expectation in the pattern of one's 
shoes, which are "shown to the world with every footstep." State v. Selvidge, 635 
P.2d 736, 740 (Wash App., Div. 2, 1981). "The soles of a person's shoes, and 
especially the pattern on the soles of a person's shoes, are constantly exposed 
for public view, such as when we kneel to pray, when we lift our feet to walk or 
run, when we cross our legs or prop them up on a table or chair, when we 
remove our shoes and leave them lying idly on the floor, or as in this case, when 
we leave footprints in the mud or dirt." State v. Bates, 495 A.2d 422, 427 (N.J. 
App. 1985). Like a voice exemplar, examination of the physical characteristics of 
the soles of a suspect's shoes "involves none of the probing into an individual's 
private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search." State v. 
Coleman, 593 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Az. App. 1978), approved in relevant part 593 
P.2d 653 (Az. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The physical characteristics of the soles of a person's shoes, 
like one's voice, face, and handwriting, are constantly exposed to 
the public. Footprints on the ground are visible for all to see. 
People display the soles of their shoes when they cross their legs, 
climb stairs, or put their feet up on furniture. Viewing the soles of a 
person's shoes does not "constitute [ ] the type of 'severe, though 
brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security' that is subject to 
constitutional scrutiny .... " 
Commonwealth v. Billings, 676 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Mass. App. 1997) (brackets 
original) (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)). 
In addition, compelling a defendant to provide ink printing of his shoes and 
feet as part of a grand jury investigation has been held to be like fingerprinting 
and therefore not an intrusion into privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 994-96 (3rd Cir. 1985). Indeed, Wright cites 
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to no court that has found a privacy expectation in the pattern on the soles of 
one's shoes such that requiring a suspect to show it to officers constitutes a 
search. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-21.) 
Wright first argues that the analysis in Curry-that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the soles of the shoes-is dicta. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
16-17.) Although the holding of the case was that the seizure of Curry's shoes 
without a warrant was proper upon his arrest based on probable cause, that 
holding was based on the analysis that the evidence leading to probable cause to 
arrest (matching footprints to Curry's shoes) was not obtained by an improper 
search. Curry, 103 Idaho at 338, 647 P.2d at 794. That Curry had no privacy 
interest infringed by looking at the soles of his shoes was thus central to the 
court's holding that the seizure of the known relevant evidence (the shoes) was 
lawful, not mere dicta. 
Even if the analysis in Curry could be characterized as dicta the analysis 
is still correct: Wright had no reasonable expectation of privacy infringed by 
photographing the soles of his shoes. Curry, 103 Idaho at 338, 647 P.2d at 794; 
Ferri, 778 F.2d at 994-96; Coleman, 593 P.2d at 686-87; Billings, 676 N.E.2d at 
65; Bates, 495 A.2d at 427; Selvidge, 635 P.2d at 740. Wright argues that the 
"logic" of these cases has been "overruled" by precedent of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18.) He asserts that in Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), where the Court stated that moving stereo 
equipment in the defendant's house to find serial numbers constituted a search, 
the "Supreme Court[] reject[ed] the idea that a de minimis search is of no 
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constitutional significance." (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) The flaw in this argument 
is that nowhere in Curry is the concept of a de minimis search even mentioned. 
Rather, the case was decided on the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
Curry, 103 Idaho at 338, 647 P.2d at 794 ("Curry did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to the physical characteristics of the soles of 
his shoes."); a concept, to undersigned's knowledge, that has not been overruled 
by the Supreme Court. 
If Wright had left fingerprints instead of shoe prints at the scene of the 
crime, there is little doubt that taking his fingerprints for comparison would not 
have been a search. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) 
(requiring the provision of a voice exemplar, like fingerprinting, is not a search). 
That he left shoe prints instead is not of constitutional significance. Taking a 
photograph of the bottom of his shoe, like inking his fingers and taking 
impressions, did not intrude on his reasonable expectation of privacy and was 
therefore not a search. Wright's claim of fundamental error fails. 
2. Wright Has Shown No Clear Error 
Wright's claim of fundamental error fails on the second prong of the test 
because the error is not plain on the record. It is improper for a prosecutor to 
request a jury to infer guilt from the invocation of a constitutional right. Greer v. 
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-65 (1987) (mere reference to silence not enough; state 
must use evidence to create inference of guilt). Thus, it is improper for a 
prosecutor to comment on "a defendant's refusal to consent to a search." State 
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v. Betancourt, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _,2011 WL 3305382, *5 (Idaho App., 
Aug. 3,2011). Wright has failed to show plain error for two reasons. 
First, as noted above, Wright had no right to refuse the photographing or 
other observation of the physical characteristics of his shoes. Wright has not 
argued, much less presented authority, suggesting that a prosecutor may not talk 
about resistance to lawful police efforts to gather evidence. Because it is not 
clear from the record that any reference to any legitimate effort to invoke any 
actual constitutional right is involved in this case, Wright has failed to show clear 
error. 
Second, the error is not clear on the record because the evidence does 
not show that Wright was in fact attempting to assert any Fourth Amendment 
right. At the scene of the stop Wright "voiced some concerns that I was violating 
his rights [by photographing his shoes], picking on him because he is a black 
man and that I was fishing because we hadn't found anything at that point." 
(Trial Tr., p. 100, Ls. 9-13 (emphasis added).) Another officer testified that 
Wright at one point stated he was not going to give permission to photograph the 
shoes, but that statement was apparently not in response to a request for a 
consent search but was instead in the face of officer insistence that he allow the 
shoes to be photographed. (Trial Tr., p. 212, Ls. 17-20.) A third officer, called by 
the defense, testified that Wright refused to cooperate with photographing his 
shoes unless the photographing was witnessed by his brother. (Trial Tr., p. 387, 
L. 13 - p. 389, L. 23.) The record suggests that, rather than asserting a Fourth 
Amendment right, Wright was refusing to cooperate with the officers' lawful 
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insistence that his shoes be photographed by claiming that the officers' attempt 
to look at the soles of his shoes was racial harassment and insisting that his 
brother witness the police investigation. 
Wright's appellate argument that the prosecution was trying to get the jury 
to infer guilt from the exercise of a Fourth Amendment right is not supported by 
the record. On the contrary, the record appears to support the inference that 
Wright was simply resisting the lawful directives of the police for reasons 
unrelated to any assertion of Fourth Amendment rights. 
3. Wright Has Shown No Prejudice 
The entirety of Wright's prejudice argument is to note that the prosecutor 
acknowledged that the evidence of Wright's guilt was circumstantial.2 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 20-21.) Wright cannot prevail on this argument; his claim 
that any error is automatically prejudicial when the evidence is circumstantial is 
meritless. 
2 The evidence circumstantially showing Wright's guilt discussed by the 
prosecutor included evidence that one of the victims had positively identified 
Kenneth Wright as the other robber; both Wright brothers possessed shoes 
matching the footprints left at or near the robbery; Wright and his associates 
were in possession of bills in numbers and denominations closely matching the 
money stolen in the robbery; ski masks consistent with those worn by the robbers 
were found in the car in which Wright was a passenger; Wright generally 
matched the description of the robber (whose face was concealed by a ski 
mask); the presence of the car Wright was later stopped in being near the scene 
of the robbery shortly after the robbery; Wright lying about his whereabouts and 
activities at the time of the crime; Wright being present (and photographed) at 
businesses near the scene of the robbery shortly before the robbery; Wright 
trying to conceal the money in his possession; and the robber wore a hoody 
identical to one found in the car and worn by Wright in the photographs near the 
time of the robbery. (7/10/10 Tr., p. 101, L. 12 - p. 111, L. 25.) 
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III. 
Wright Has Failed To Show That Evidence He Had Entered A Bank And 
Behaved Suspiciously The Day Before The Robbery Was Irrelevant 
A. Introduction 
During the trial the state presented evidence of the activities of Wright and 
his associates-Wright's brother, Kenneth, and Roosevelt Hogg-on the day 
before and the day of the robbery. Specifically, the state presented evidence that 
the three men had twice entered the Bank of America down the street from the 
robbery site with no apparent business the day before the robbery (Trial Tr., p. 
301, L. 23 - p. 320, L. 11; p. 333, L. 3 - p. 343, L. 8; State's Exhibits 59, 60, 70, 
71, 74); and entered the Albertsons across the street from the robbery site the 
morning of the robbery (Trial Tr., p. 293, L. 13 - p. 299, L. 21; p. 327, L. 13 - p. 
333, L. 2; State's Exhibit 58b). Wright objected to evidence about his presence 
in the bank on the grounds it was irrelevant. (Trial Tr., p. 305, Ls. 19-24; p. 313, 
Ls. 2-3; p. 315, Ls. 12-13.) The district court overruled the objections. (Trial Tr., 
p. 305, L. 25 - p. 306, L. 10; p. 313, Ls. 4-15; p. 315, Ls. 14-15.) 
On appeal Wright argues that evidence he "behaved suspiciously in a 
bank" is not "relevant to the question of whether Mr. Wright robbed the Cash 
Store, and should not have been admitted." (Appellant's brief, p. 23.) On the 
contrary, evidence that Wright, wearing clothing associated with the robber of the 
Cash Store, was with his known associates scouting out a bank near the Cash 
Store for a robbery the day before the robbery of the Cash Store is relevant 
evidence. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 
671, 674, 52 P.3d 315,318 (2002); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d 
754, 760 (Ct. App. 2011). 
C. The Evidence Was Relevant 
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence 
is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 
544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). '''Evidence of a plan or design or scheme is 
relevant, if it tends by reasonable inference to establish the commission of the 
crime charged.'" State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 721, 249 P.3d 1169, 1176 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (quoting State v. Alford, 47 Idaho 162, 174, 272 P. 1010, 1013 
(1928)). Evidence that Wright was out with his associates looking for a place to 
rob, the day before the charged robbery, in the vicinity of the robbery, while 
dressed in clothes later worn by the robbers, is undoubtedly relevant. 3 
IV. 
Wright Has Failed To Show That There Was More Than One Preserved Error To 
Cumulate 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
3 The state also asserts that any error in admitting irrelevant evidence is harmless 
in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt as set forth in the Statement of the 
Facts and Course of the Proceedings, above. 
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Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453,872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Cumulative error 
analysis does not, however, include errors neither objected to nor found 
fundamental. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 220, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). 
Wright has failed to show any error, much less two or more preserved errors. 
Thus, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See,~, 
LaBellev. State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Wright's conviction for 
robbery. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2011. 
K NNETH K. JOR 
Deputy Attorney G 
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